

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10138

24 November 1981

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 750



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10138

24 November 1981

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

FOUO No. 750

CONTENTS

ANGOLA

South African Strategy, Aims Analyzed (Achille Lollo; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 12 Oct 81)	1
War in Angola Seen Directly Pitting West Against Communism (Roger Holeindre; PARIS MATCH, 16 Oct 81)	4

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Paper Describes Reasons French Aid Essential in Maintaining Stability (Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Oct 81)	7
--	---

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

President Discusses Progress Made by His Regime (Nguema Mbasogo Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 14 Oct 81)	14
---	----

GUINEA

Briefs	
Cash Restraint Advocated	17
Dispute With France	17

MADAGASCAR

Briefs	
Economic Plight	18

MOZAMBIQUE

Regulations on Cashew Marketing for 1981-1982 Detailed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Oct 81)	19
Briefs	
Maputo Milk Consumption	20

- a -

[III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

RND Leader Discusses Party's Objectives, Ideology
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 12-25 Oct 81) 21

SEYCHELLES

Rene Wants Stronger Ties With France
(Albert Rene Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIA, 12-25 Oct 81) 27

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGY, AIMS ANALYZED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 250, 12 Oct 81 p 24

[Article by Achille Lollo: "Pretoria's New Plans"]

[Text] In its official statements, the government in Pretoria insists it has made a so-called total withdrawal of its troops from southern Angola. And yet, on 18 September, Gen Charles Lloyd, commander in chief of the forces stationed in Namibia, had to send emergency reinforcements to South African troops attacked by the Angolan Army -- particularly units of the "Namibian territorial forces," trained according to the pattern of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts -- in order to enable the armored battalion accompanying the 1st Motorized Infantry Column and the Buffalo 32 mercenary battalion to return to safer areas close to the Namibian border. Since the launching of the Angolan counteroffensive, the latter had in fact been in difficulty and risked remaining in the Xangongo region, where they were surprised by the attack of the FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] and cut off from their rear guard.

As we had announced, the Angolan Army had, by using guerrilla techniques, succeeded in escaping from air reconnaissance and in going around the advance posts of the South African Army, who had prepared to defend the occupied territory by concentrating around six centers, transformed into strongholds.

According to General Geldenhuys, strategist of the war, the South African troops were capable of halting the offensive which the FAPLA would more than likely have launched following the criteria of traditional warfare, with the aid of the Cuban Army.

Actually, following a distribution of the tasks of defending southern Angola, the Cubans were in charge of holding a support line immediately south of the capital of Huila Province, and only the FAPLA undertook this bold counteroffensive in Xangongo, Mongua and Ondjiva. Small but multiple columns of the Angolan Army were penetrating the regions occupied by Pretoria between 18 and 22 September, forcing the invaders to engage in close battle and making the intervention of the South African artillery and Air Force impossible. From 20 to 22 September, with the arrival of contingents sent to the aid of units almost completely encircled by the FAPLA, these forces of occupation, exhausted, began their retreat to the south. They were then going to have a general withdrawal and concentrate in the regions of Cuamato, 40 kilometers from the border, Calueque and Namacunde, closer to the border.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

These positions, which the South African Army will not give up for a long time, still enable it to keep the city of Ondjiva, as well as the entire province of which this city is the capital, in a state of total insecurity, while preparing for a second counteroffensive from a favorable position. That is what the Angolan minister of defense, who has just publicly denounced the military plan that the South Africans will follow, foresees.

This time, Pretoria's army allegedly intends to clear the way as far as Cuvelai, 200 kilometers from the border, still preceded by intense bombing, then go west as far as Tchibembe, already used as a target by the planes during the first offensive, and east, as far as Nehone. Thus, a front line at the 16th parallel, which marks the boundaries between Cunene and Huila provinces, would be established.

It is therefore a question of creating a buffer zone in southern Angola, totally surrounding Cunene. In that province, despite the tactical victory of the Angolan Army, which has considerably reduced the so-called "vital space" which General Geldenhuys intended to keep, the situation has not changed a great deal, with the obvious exception of the aid that may finally be taken to the martyred people. The same threats weigh on the entire region. But without a doubt, the South African plan of strategy has been substantially upset. Pretoria, whose intentions of "internationalizing" the conflict in order to make it move toward a "confrontation between blocs" are now obvious, hoped that at least, if there were an Angolan counteroffensive involving combat, the Cubans would participate in it, which would have permitted Brand Fourie, South African deputy minister of foreign affairs, who on 20 September met with the American Chester Crocker in Zurich, to talk of the fighting between Pretoria's army and the Cubans. This would have facilitated the demand, previous to any negotiations on Namibia, for the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. Pretoria would then give free rein to its expansionist and destabilization plans for Angola.

Under the Wing of the Pentagon

At the same time, other moves in the same direction were to see the light: The engagement of the armies of the reactionary regimes of Central Africa alongside the South African forces would be the last "find" employed by Washington, in other words, the "Africanization" of the destabilization of the progressive regimes in southern Africa. This information, made public by a Portuguese weekly, gave rise to the denial of one of the countries involved: Zaire. But the memory of the latter's aggression against Angola, carrying out a plan already conceived in Washington and executed jointly with South Africa, is still too recent to allow the denials to bury this new affair so soon, especially since we know that many Zairian generals have not digested the defeat that their troops suffered in 1975-1976 or the disappearance of their protegee, the FNLA, from the political scene.

It would therefore not be surprising that South Africa would once more try to emerge from its isolation by appealing to certain African countries.

Pretoria also has another trump card for trying to internationalize this conflict: its insertion into the Southern Atlantic Alliance (SATO) which, bringing Chile, Argentina and Uruguay (Brazil has increasingly kept its distance recently) together into the same "anticommunist" front, is making great progress under the protective wing of the Pentagon.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Angolan leaders are very aware of all that is at stake. The organizational secretary of the MPLA-Labor Party, Lucio Lara, emphasized at a meeting in Benguela that "it is the Angolans who repulsed the South African aggression. Through South Africa, it is imperialism that is threatening Angola directly."

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.

11,464

CSO: 4719/126

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

WAR IN ANGOLA SEEN DIRECTLY PITTING WEST AGAINST COMMUNISM

Paris PARIS MATCH in French No 1689, 16 Oct 81 p 65

[Article by Roger Holeindre]

[Excerpts] The Angola-Namibia war can no longer be considered as an inter-African conflict; it is instead a direct confrontation between the West and communism.

The South African soldiers have found irrefutable proof of the strong Soviet and East German implantation while meticulously searching the terrain they have occupied in Angola in the course of operation "Proteus." A total of 4,000 tons of Soviet material has been seized or destroyed and SAM 7, SAM 3 and SAM 6 have been discovered.

T-34 tanks and more than 200 new vehicles have been brought back to Namibia, as well as an impressive quantity of heavy equipment, ranging from amphibious tanks to Stalin organs launching 122-mm rockets. Classic artillery and anti-aircraft artillery are similar to those used by the POLISARIO units against Morocco. Numerous Soviet and East German spouses accompany their instructor or advisor husbands, which tends to prove that theirs will be protracted stays.

A vast radar system was deployed along the border with South Africa, but it seems --and there is proof of that--that only the material serviced by Europeans ensured a continuous watch....

On the other hand, the launchingpads of ground-to-air missiles serviced solely by the communists from "brotherly countries" created problems for the attacking air force.

The South African and Namibian soldiers found buried defense lines, whose conception and execution leave the impression that Asiatics have served as instructors--perhaps even North Vietnamese, the only serious users of the French officer's manual, chapter "field fortifications." It is indeed in this manual that Giap's men had found all the necessary information for the trench and underground war around Dien Bien Phu.

According to the South Africans, there is the threat of a large-scale war exploding soon in the southern part of the continent. Gen Charles Lloyd, commander of the South African and Namibian forces on the Angolan border, has just declared: "We are necessarily preparing ourselves, militarily and logistically, for a classic war on the Angolan frontier...."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Whatever the logical and humanitarian reasons for the condemnation of apartheid by the majority of the world's governments, one must nevertheless admit that South Africa will fight for what it considers its right to live.

Today, the Namibian problem is closely connected in the underground war opposing South Africa to the Soviet Union by way of Angola.

The Soviets, the socialist bloc powers and Cuba help the SWAPO, based in Angola and fighting against South Africa, which supports not only the legal Namibian Government it partly controls, but also, within Angola itself, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, with the latter giving a great deal of trouble to the troops of the Luanda government established with the help of the Soviets and Cubans. In 1981, the Marxist Angolan Government is controlling less than 2 million people out of the 6 million inhabitants. Its army, the FAPLA, is on the alert everywhere and many of the garrisons are only re-supplied by Soviet aircraft. Jonas Savimbi is accusing the Luanda government of having engaged in the war against South Africa and Namibia solely to make people forget about its colossal internal problems. The potentially rich drained country cannot even feed its own population, while under the Portuguese it exported cereals, meat, coffee and fish in large quantities. The armed opposition imputes the responsibility for this state of affairs to the "disastrous economic policy based on the Soviet model." The South African army, by far the best-trained and equipped in Africa thanks to its specialists who know how to take the utmost advantage of the available sophisticated materiel--which is certainly not the case in other African armies--has no intention of displaying moderation. Moreover, its leaders, applying Israeli tactics, are very explicit on the subject: "We shall strike all the way into Ethiopia if necessary! We are already feeding one-third of Africa; what more do they want of us? We are white Africans. Is it a crime if we want to stay, defend our country and not disappear?... Wherever the white minority dealt without genuine guarantees and without preserving the authority over military resources, it has been swept away. We are not fighting against our blacks within the country, we are fighting against enemies without, those who, abetted, armed and paid by the Soviets, threaten our freedom and our very existence as a nation."

Events in Zimbabwe provide serious arguments to those blacks and whites in Namibia who do not want the rebels to be considered as representative of the population. With the departure of the whites from Zimbabwe--at the rate of nearly 10,000 a month--the country will be faced in a couple of years with the same fate as the countries forming the "front line" against South Africa. These countries, formerly prosperous, with excellent soil, sun and water, are today suffering from famine.

On 4 percent of the tillable land in Africa, the South Africans grow more than a third of the continent's harvest.... Moreover, the black population, every time it finds credible leaders, rises up and fights against regimes imposed by the "fair-minded" thinkers of Europe and the United States. If Savimbi is fighting--and fighting well--in Angola, in Mozambique the National Resistance Movement already has 4 to 5,000 anti-Marxist fighters in the bush and is giving a lot of trouble to local authorities and to the KGB men: it seems that, despite the deployment of men and materiel, relations between the Soviet, East Germans, Cubans and the civilian population are not always idyllic.... On the whole, the Soviets are hated by the Africans, whom they call "black asses."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Soviets' "fraternal" help is very, very expensive.... The USSR has been successful in obtaining all the fishing rights in Mozambican and Angolan waters. As in all the African countries it "protects," and where it has also gotten hold of the same maritime rights, its fishing fleets depredate marine resources, with less than 40 percent of the results of this anti-ecological massacre finally reaching the tables of the socialist countries.

It is interesting to know that these somewhat special "fishing fleets" steam around as veritable little squadrons directly connected to Admiral Gorshkov's navy general staff.

As for the Cubans, whom the East Germans characterize as "poor soldiers" and "clowns," they are accused by the population of having totally sacked the country. This assertion seems to be borne out by impartial observers. All of the movable goods left behind by the departing Portuguese, as well as civilian vehicles, have most left for Cuba....

The most astonishing revelations uncovered by operation "Proteus" in Angola are those related to intelligence. Mountains of documents prove that African Marxist movements have found support in unexpected quarters: they are financed by the Ecumenical Council of Churches with headquarters in Geneva.

In recent years, the main beneficiaries of this incredible largesse are the SWAPO and the black South African terrorist groups. These organizations also receive funds indirectly from the UN, the UNESCO and other so-called "charitable" movements that solicit funds in large European cities to aid the "hungry people of the Third World"!

Such funds reach in the millions of dollars. Let us add, in conclusion, that from the documents seized, it appears that Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion and New Caledonia are still considered as countries struggling against French colonialism, and needing support in shaking off this terrible yoke....

COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse S.A.

CSO: 4719/172

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

PAPER DESCRIBES REASONS FRENCH AID ESSENTIAL IN MAINTAINING STABILITY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 9 Oct 81 p 2543-2546

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere]

[Excerpts] David Dacko's statements after his ouster by Gen Andre Kolingba have intrigued French readers and television viewers somewhat. Smiling and tongue in cheek, the former president of the Central African Republic was obviously trying to make people understand that the coup d'etat that had overthrown him actually stemmed, even if it had taken place in keeping with the rules governing the genre, from a semi-official arrangement. Consequently, the natural question was precisely who had thought up the scenario and against what.

Dacko scarcely refutes the accusation that he was not only the co-author, but also the true beneficiary, from his standpoint at least. Suffering from asthma and circulatory problems, he certainly aspires to rest and freedom from ends of months made painful by the suicidal demands of civil servants and the delays of financial backers. His unselfishness -- he was known to make up the sums out of his own pocket -- means that he will hardly miss the precarious charms of power. Finally, he can only take pleasure in the excellent trick played on his adversaries, from Patasse to Goumba, placing bayonets between their ambitions and the levers of government.

Nor is it impossible that Dacko may have taken a certain satisfaction, tinged with bitterness, it is true, in showing France -- one of whose governments had brought him out of exile fairly willingly -- what the consequences would be of the inadequate and irregular financial "followup" given to the change in regime it had decided upon and carried out after so much hesitation. This relative satisfaction is joined with that of thwarting the tendencies that were manifested within the French left in favor of the man who, out of all the Central African politicians, nevertheless seems to be least suited to take over after him: Abel Goumba.

In other words, no strictly political factor -- much less a French domestic political factor -- influenced the support given at the outset by France to David Dacko. In fact, this teacher of the classics -- the spiritual heir of Barthelemy Boganda, who had made him minister of interior in the last government formed before his death -- is and remains a leftist democrat. One may dispute the timeliness of the multiparty system, quite unusual in Africa, that he sponsored in 1980, but not the fact that it was the expression of a sincere conviction, as witnessed by the impartiality of the 1981 presidential elections, in which he won but 51 percent of the votes. The preferential popularity which Goumba seems to enjoy in certain quarters

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

probably stems from inadequate information, but also from a Manichean algebra according to which the friends of our enemies are our enemies as well, and their enemies our friends. Enthroned by Giscard d'Estaing, Dacko remained suspect.

If we bring this out, it is not in order to question Goumba's qualities. Did past squabbles with Dacko, his imprisonment and a 17-year stay in Europe, first of all, to complete his medical studies, and then in Africa as regional head of the World Health Organization, influence an itinerary that took him more to Marxist countries, such as Benin or the Congo, than to others? Judging by his vocabulary and friendships, one imagines that he would be rather disposed to appealing to the East, which did not endear him to Giscard d'Estaing, but which should not make him much more sympathetic to Mitterrand or most of our African allies. The truth is that, aside from all political considerations, Abel Goumba cannot reasonably hope, without outside help, to govern the Central African Republic for the simple reason that over 50 percent of the country's population was born after his departure, he did not return before 1981, comes from a minority ethnic group in the Grimari region in the eastern region of the country, and the ignorance concerning his name is not made up for by any tribal influence. The score of 1 percent that he won in the presidential elections is on an exact par with his credit.

Dacko's smile before the French television cameras is not therefore without justification. General Kolingba's coup d'etat not only permits him to solve his health problems, but also to cut off any suggestions of a "national union" government, re-introducing Goumba on the political scene and gently beginning a change in his favor. Dacko has repeatedly maintained that if it were a civilian who succeeded him at head of state, he would almost infallibly be led to seek support in the communist world. This would very likely have been true of Goumba, but even moreso of Patasse, whom neither his services under Bokassa -- to whom he owes his career and for whom he was minister of agriculture, prime minister and minister of the coronation -- nor his Libyan commitments nor the dubious origin of his funds have prevented him from winning 38 percent of the votes in the April elections. It would not be any more desirable to see the other candidates surge forward since all of them were, to some extent, the aides and accomplices of the former emperor. The most capable among them, Maidou, was one of the few to be involved in the process of ousting Bokassa, but he has not succeeded in getting rid of the "Mr Denial" label pinned on him for a long time to come by Bangui lycee students (Maidou, then prime minister, officially denied the massacre of young people that was the basis of Bokassa's departure).

Aware of the exceptional decisions required by the economic and financial situation, but with little taste or inclination for the style of government they demand, Dacko remains faithful to himself, yielding to others of whom such a style is normally expected. Jean-Pierre Cot recently told the diplomatic press associations and the Eurafrican press "that a military government was always an admission of failure." This is in fact often true. However, it is admirable that a chief of state would recognize such a failure and his inability to remedy it. It would appear that this moderate homage was Dacko's due.

Civil Service, Budget Deficit and Debt

The restoration of normal road and river traffic, a solution to the fuel supply problem -- now the task of Central African Total Management (TOCAGES), a joint venture

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

in which Total Afrique holds 49 percent and the Central African Republic 51 percent, in place of the American Transworld Oil Company, which had obtained the concession from Bokassa -- the withdrawal of one-fifth of the army cadres, and finally, the financial rehabilitation of national companies constituting one of the old regime's open wounds, are all operations to put on the positive side of the ledger of the retiring president. Unfortunately, when a country is in the state of decomposition which is that of the Central African Republic, its successes barely emerge, here and there, from a morass of deficits and bankruptcies, whose overlapping is such that seen from one angle, any truly positive action might have aggravating effects from another. This is the case of the rehabilitation of national companies, obtained with the cooperation of our technical assistants and the support of the French Treasury but which, resulting in several thousand layoffs, makes the job situation even more critical during a period of disinterest in farm work and the increasing urban concentration linked to it.

The expansion of the Central African civil service obviously constitutes one of the current anomalies. Put at some 7,000 government employees and officials in 1960, 11,650 in 1966 (655 technical assistants, including 558 French, 5,227 Central African employees, 805 contractors and 4,953 *decisionnaires* [translation unknown], with pay then representing 53 percent of the operating budget), and 14,000 in 1973, the number is now about 25,000, of which 23,000 are actually paid. Nothing in the national production or revenue justifies such an increase. Since 1977, that income has been declining 5 percent annually. The figure is expected to reach 6 percent in 1981 and 7 to 8 percent in 1982. Since Dacko came to power in 1979, an additional 1,000 officials have been recruited (it was actually a matter of eliminating the excessive firings decreed by the preceding regime). The average level of salaries has risen 20 percent. Whether fair or not, these measures have naturally aggravated a situation characterized by an annual cost of 21 billion CFA for government employees, when the amount of budget receipts (allocated receipts excluded) is only 17 billion!

Dacko's government has been criticized for not striking when the iron was hot, immediately after his return, following an operation identical to the one used to repair the injustices of the previous administration in order to clean out the elements of the civil service that had been introduced according to the whim of the former emperor and in much larger proportions. By encouraging part of these elements to go back home, the operation would have relieved the constant pressure exercised on the government by Bangui government employees and would have been beneficial politically. Unfortunately, it is not certain that the national employment situation would have been improved or that the "detribalized" persons would have been put back to work. A closer examination reveals, in fact, that from 1977 to 1980, the overall number of wage earners in the public and private sectors remained stable, with the increase in the number of public employees mainly stemming from those cast out of the private sector. Since January 1981, civil service hiring has been frozen, but the overall number of wage earners has dropped 20 percent. It should be noted in passing that cutbacks on European personnel by enterprises have not been made up for by any hiring of Central African personnel.

As catastrophic as the situation of the civil service might appear as a symptom of poor economic health, it has only an indirect effect on government finances. The "ends of month" that caused Dacko to lose so much sleep were and are still almost entirely covered by the French Treasury. In 1980, the budget deficit amounted to

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

8 billion CFA francs, a figure to be compared with the 7-billion-CFA franc subsidy paid by France during the same fiscal year. In 1981, the initial deficit was 7 billion also. It will in fact reach 11 billion by the end of the year, a phenomenon due to the uncontrolled spending and the 5 billion francs in arrears from 1980, while the 25-percent increase in receipts that might be expected from inflation and increased fiscal pressure finally comes down to 10 percent. Actually, tax proceeds drop as taxes increase, even though applied to such reliable resources as hydrocarbons, industrial and commercial profits and wages.

Consequently, in 1981, the 4 billion CFA francs from the International Monetary Fund and the 3 billion from France only cover the budget deficit announced and not the real deficit. The difference: 4 billion, must be found from a levy of 500 million out of the credits allocated by the FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund], 500 million as an extra payment from the special drawing rights (3.9 billion CFA francs instead of 2.6 billion), 400 million from the modification in the Central African Republic's ceiling with the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), an additional subsidy of 1.2 billion recently requested from the French Government, and finally, by a one-month delay in paying government employees, which will have to be made up in one way or another. In addition to the government's distress resulting from the hole to be filled are those -- stemming from the insufficiency of Treasury funds -- resulting from the delays with which certain payments have been made and of which Paris is not always aware. For example, the agreement on the last two payments of the French subsidy, planned before the departure of President Giscard d'Estaing, was not signed until 10 July and the funds were not made available to Dacko until 17 July, only 3 days before the Le Club Cinema attack.

In 1982, lacking a new IMF program and a balancing subsidy from France, the Central African Government should, in the worst instance, have to face. A joint mission from the two organizations will take up the problem in October in Bangui. But it is clear that at an average budget level of 28 billion CFA francs, the term "re-balancing" appears to be only a euphemism.

The service on the debt largely maintains the budget deficit. The conventional public debt is 55 billion (without considering the opening of a 7-billion CFA franc credit for Bokassa by South Africa, for construction of the Inter Continental Hotel; some 3 billion were actually invested, without any positive result, it would appear). It is less the level of the figure, considering that of export receipts (+ 30 billion), that makes its seriousness than the 18 billion in arrears whose weight it bears. The consolidation granted in June by the Club de Paris attenuates the burden by setting the percentage of arrears to be paid in 1981 at 3, 4 percent for each of the following three years and the rest in 6 years. In addition, there is the interest on overdue payments which only certain creditors have given up: This was the case of Yugoslavia but not Switzerland. The 1982 payments are heavy, as the result of poorly studied short- and medium-term loans. The receipts of the Autonomous Amortization Fund, which manages the public debt, are also down (the tax on beer consumed, which is one of its resources, has had its proceeds drop 15 percent in one year). Actually, only the cancellations of debts by France and the Federal Republic of Germany seem likely to provide some relief, sufficiently soon if they want to prevent the worst, to the jamming of government departments and the entire economy.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Moreover, in order to draw an accurate picture of the financial situation of the Central African Republic, one should take into account, not only the unfortunately unrecoverable sums squandered by Bokassa, but also his misappropriation of public funds put into Swiss accounts, enabling the Prince Regent and his family to lead a high life in Geneva or Paris. Their amount is estimated at 50 billion CFA francs, not including the crown, sceptre and solid gold necklace for the coronation which have mysteriously disappeared. The sale of a few chateaux purchased in France by the former emperor will perhaps make it possible -- although this is not certain -- to recover a small part of the sum. The rest would be enough to pay off most of the public debt. Although there is little talk of this and while it is unknown whether this situation gave rise to the international measures it would justify, financially speaking, this is the most overwhelming evidence of the "Bokassa scandals."

To the amounts devoted by France to the restoration of public services, one must add a 5-billion CFA franc subsidy in addition to the budget, including 1 billion to compensate merchants who were the victims of the Bangui lootings in 1979, 1.4 billion to pay the debts of the joint ventures, 1.3 billion for those of the national firms and the rest to pay Central African counterpart funds not put into international projects or to set up a national fund to replace the Development Bank which disappeared in the turmoil. Furthermore, the FAC allocations continue to be paid on the approximate annual basis of 80 million French francs, including 60 million for technical assistance, 6 million for scientific research, 8 million for training and cooperation, 2 million for military equipment and some 10.7 million for aid to strictly economic investments.

It must be observed that these means taken as a whole did not check the constant drop in agricultural, mining and industrial production. The benefits that can be expected from the construction of infrastructures will come in the long run, but the malady undermining the Central African economy seems to justify vigorous, rapid remedies. The dismantling of the old private sector and its replacement by an inoperative national or mixed economy sector did not lead to the economic takeoff on which people had counted, once the administrative machine was somewhat back on its feet. Urban concentration is growing worse. (One wage earner supports an average of ten persons in Bangui.) Paradoxically enough, at the same time, the bush is returning to a subsistence economy, which is improperly understood in the affirmation that "Central Africans no longer want to work." They are actually working in a different world and the slow impregnation of the domestic economy by the market economy, which constitutes the essential economic element of the colonial achievement, has slowed down or disappeared. In areas where cotton is grown, it was the area of the cottonfield which, the second year, determined that of sesame, peanuts and finally, that of manioc.

It is now necessary to recommence an evolution that took decades of efforts and one notes with concern that it is not enough to set up a scales near the cottonfield or to present encouragement to peasants -- in the form of imported products -- to develop their activity. The Central African Republic's cotton harvest totaled 50,000 tons in the best years. It is now only 18,000 tons, representing 25 percent of all exports still. SOCADA [expansion unknown], set up by the new government with the aid of the FAC, long-term loans from the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation and technical assistance from the French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers, in order to face the deficiencies of the UCCA (Central African Cotton

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Union), seems to have overestimated the possibilities of relaunching cotton, inasmuch as the program it set up would only be profitable over 40,000 tons. Seasonal loans applied for were twice as high as real needs. Either the programs should be reduced or they should be continued with losses for a few years in the four prefectures of Ouham-Pende, Ouham, "economic" Gribingui and Ouaka. The STABEX [Export Stabilization Fund] payments should facilitate the effort, on the condition, naturally, that they go into the equalization funds and are not simply budgeted, as has been the practice in recent years.

The boost given to coffee production by the 1974 boom has had a somewhat prolonged effect, despite Bokassa's confiscation of the profits of the Support Fund. Since that time, the old age and poor maintenance of coffee plantations, thefts from the tree affecting nearly 40 percent of the crop and finally, the drop in prices dealt a severe blow. This year, the tonnage exported should not exceed 7,500, compared with 14,000 in 1978-1979.

For its first phase, the establishment of an oil palm plantation at Bassongo received a loan from the African Development Bank. Poor operating conditions affected a profitability visible only over 4,000 hectares. Nevertheless, resumption of the affair is being studied with the support of the Agricultural Bank and the contribution of Belgian capital.

The Central African Republic owes its trade balance surplus to diamonds. Bokassa's expulsion of European enterprises reduced production by half (400,000 carats in 1974; 250,000 in 1980), a drop which was not remedied by the drop in prices in April 1981. This is official production, it is true, and does not take into account the smuggling organized to the East by Muslim merchants who have largely monopolized the local market, imposing their prices on producers, while in Bangui itself, a purchasing office and the gem cutting shops are controlled by Israeli Americans.

Actually, the cottage industry, now the only form of mining, is very inefficient and covers only already known deposits, meaning the halt of all prospecting. The action of COGEMA [General Nuclear Materials Company], subsidiary of the French Atomic Energy Commission, remains linked to the granting of permits in Mambere and Sangha. Despite criticisms of principle of which it is the target and which politics has deliberately sharpened, it would appear to be the only organization able to get production back on its feet, given the current state of affairs.

Oil prospecting is at a minimum. Conoco is operating in the Chadian border region, closely following progress in research in neighboring countries. As for the Bakouma uranium, its extraction does not appear to be justified by current processing techniques. It is postponed until better times.

From this gloomy picture, one must absolutely not infer that the limited but real resources of the Central African Republic are inadequate to ensure the support and development of the population. Sixteen years of looting and incompetent management have led to contradictory reactions of "lumpen proletarianization" and domestic paralysis that cannot be dissipated by the mere rehabilitation of public services, even of development organizations or communications networks. It is in the field of human activity and customs that action must be taken, which could be very slow and certainly costly if one wishes to speed up the necessary rate of treatment. Understanding this, Dacko preferred to resign, hoping that his departure would bring his

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

successor the international understanding so often refused to him and, at the same time, freedom from the burden of his own mistakes.

General Kolingba may provide the favorable conditions the country needs during its recovery. One of his first actions will be to have the Council of Ministers pass a bill drafted several months ago and prescribing the retirement of all civil servants with 27 years of service and encouraging withdrawal from the civil service through the institution of the special leave. Likewise, he may help to change the defensive attitude of the commercial and industrial sectors, an attitude they have been prompted to take in the past and which partial indemnifications have not helped dissipate.

The fact remains that the change itself cannot be brought about without outside financial help. For having openly intervened in Central African politics in 1979, France, *a contrario*, admitted its responsibility for the process of deterioration that has affected the country since 1966. It must now assume it without quibbling, the enemy of effectiveness. The financial effort needed for a rehabilitation, not only of the administration, but of the economy as well, is an estimated 15 billion CFA francs a year, renewed for 5 years, not including the FAC allocations which have other objectives. It is up to the French Government to decide whether stability in this region of Africa is worth that price.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.

11,464
CSO: 4719/133

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

PRESIDENT DISCUSSES PROGRESS MADE BY HIS REGIME

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1084, 14 Oct 81 supplement pp 102, 103

[Interview with Col Nguema Mbasogo, president of Equatorial Guinea, by Noel Ngouo Ngabissio, on 22 Sep 81, place not given]

[Text] Those who met Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo the day after the coup of 3 August 1979 will remember a young officer, age 36, shy and ill at ease at the interest he evoked in a pack of international journalists who were curious to meet "the man who felled Tiger Macias." Today, the president of the Supreme Military Council has gained in assurance and can put on a convincing performance. Disdainful as always of the constraints of protocol, he gave us a very informal interview, without requiring that the questions be submitted to him beforehand.

[Question] Two years ago, Equatorial Guinea got rid of the Macias dictatorship. Today, people are surprised that democratic institutions have still not been put in place...

[Answer] One of the biggest problems our continent has is excessive haste. People want to go entirely too fast, even with respect to democratization. The army of Equatorial Guinea liberated the country from an unprecedented dictatorship. Our number one concern, mind you, is for a rapid return to democratic life, with guaranteed freedoms. But some prerequisites are essential, without which the word democracy would have no meaning. I know that some leaders put up an institutional facade to give themselves legitimacy and strengthen their hold on power. You see what happened in Central Africa. I am not interested in make-believe. I want to start at the beginning, from the base.

Village councils, the result of completely free elections, are presently being set up, and they in turn will elect regional councils. We will do the same thing in the municipalities. Soon afterward, a constitutional commission will be named to draw up a draft constitution to be submitted to the people of Equatorial Guinea in a referendum, before 3 August 1982. Then, free elections will be held.

[Question] Will the constitution recognize the principle of multiple parties?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] The constitutional commission will draw up the document. I have not told them what to write. The people of Equatorial Guinea will have the final decision.

[Question] How would you describe your own record in your 2 years as the head of state?

[Answer] These last 2 years would have not been satisfactory, or even very substantial, one must recognize this. There have been deficiencies, due to a critical shortage of manpower, particularly in the agricultural sector, and due to the fact that worthwhile ties of cooperation have not been forged with the outside world. Prices have shot up; inflation rose to intolerable levels, while we were forced to keep wages down. The cadres responsible for financial matters and planning were not up to their task. These facts are deplorable, because Equatorial Guinea has resources that should enable it to move rapidly toward satisfactory development.

[Question] You have not gotten as much foreign aid as you expected?

[Answer] I am not saying that. We are appreciative of the organizations and countries that have supported us. The IMF provided us \$23 million; unfortunately, this was at the cost of the devaluation of our currency, and inflation was the result. We are on the right road with the EEC. Spain has provided us with 10 billion pesetas in emergency assistance.

Today our cooperation with that country should start covering the whole range of our relations, it should become more progressive and better planned. You have seen that Spanish missions are in our country right now; others are getting ready to come, to review the various aspects of our cooperative relations with the authorities of Equatorial Guinea.

[Question] Some political trials have recently been held. Equatorial Guinean dissidents exiled in Spain have spoken of machinations. What is that all about?

[Answer] The trial of which you speak was a public one and the international press was invited. You did not come. For us, it was a simple matter. A citizen of Equatorial Guinea who was living in exile asked to return. Not only were the doors opened wide for him, but once he was here he treacherously took advantage of the loan facilities open to all those who return to invest: 200 million bikueles (around Fr CFA 200 million). The bulk of that sum was used to corrupt some soldiers and work toward the destabilization of the regime. He very clearly received his just deserts.

[Question] You criticize the international press for not having attended the trial. But your government has sometimes confiscated newspapers, especially Spanish ones!

[Answer] We have never confiscated your weekly, JEUNE AFRIQUE, despite articles which were, let us say,...sometimes very harsh with the regime in Equatorial Guinea. If the minister of the interior, as his right, banned three Spanish papers (INTERVIU, DIARIO 16 and CAMBIO 16) it was because they persisted in telling lies about our country. Everyone knows that they are in league with Guinean dissidents in Spain. Journalists may be free to comment, but their facts must be correct!

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Question] What do you want most for your country today?

[Answer] Your question is a very important one. What I want has three aspects: real democracy, respect for human rights, prosperity, and finally self-sufficiency. We want more than anything else to establish a real democracy where the big decisions are made by the people in a totally free forum, and where human rights are guaranteed. We also want to see a rapid rehabilitation of the infrastructure needed to provide citizens of Equatorial Guinea with what they need in terms of health, education, food. Finally, we want our country to be able to develop using its own resources, especially agricultural resources. But we know that all that remains only a pious hope if the people of Equatorial Guinea, both the cadres and the laborers, fail to keep in mind the fact that above all they must be self-reliant.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.

9516

CSO: 4719/129

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GUINEA

BRIEFS

CASH RESTRAINT ADVOCATED--In a speech broadcast by Guinean radio, President Ahmed Sekou Toure recommended a reduction in the number of bills in circulation. The Guinean chief of state asked for greater restraint in the use of the money-making machine because, he explained, the mass of bills now in circulation is "clearly higher" than the total amount of currency issued in 1972 (when the syli was created) and April 1981 (after the change in monetary symbols). This inflation in the mass of bills also results from the introduction of fake sily notes issued by counterfeiters and has the effect of depreciating Guinean money and of contributing to inflation in the country. Sekou Toure also asked private merchants to set up regional unions in order to combine their means and solve problems linked to their profession. Finally, he asked for the systematic closing of "bars and cheap restaurants," which in his opinion are "places for the depravation of the morals" of young Guineans. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1874, 9 Oct 81 p 2564] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

DISPUTE WITH FRANCE--Approved by the French Cabinet in July, a bill concerning application of the French-Guinean agreement of 26 January 1977 relative to settlement of the financial dispute between the two countries is to be submitted to Parliament during the fall session. The bill, which would considerably simplify the task of the indemnification commission, should make it possible to complete the distribution of the compensation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1874, 9 Oct 81 p 2564] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

CSO: 4719/126

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

ECONOMIC PLIGHT--Didier Ratsiraka is urgently seeking 1 billion dollars to deflect the consequences of the economic crisis before the 1982 elections. Shortages have increased over the past year to the point where, in the cities, there are no longer lengthy lines in front of the stores since there is not anything to purchase. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1086, 28 Oct 81 p 43] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981]

CSO: 4719/214

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOZAMBIQUE

REGULATIONS ON CASHEW MARKETING FOR 1981-1982 DETAILED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1872, 9 Oct 81 p 2587

[Excerpts] A ruling from the Office of Secretary of State for the Cashew Crop establishes regulations applicable to marketing in Mozambique for the 1981-1982 season. The purchase of cashews can be made by private concerns, government firms, cooperatives and other structures that might be interested in the future (plant representatives, for example). All must be registered with the provincial delegations of the Ministry of Domestic Commerce so as to be able to obtain bank credits.

The minimum price to be paid to the planter-collector is 5 meticaïs per kilogram, whatever the purchase place. The purchase price to be paid by industry, at the entry-to-the-plant stage or by plant representatives at the entry-to-storage stage is set at 7,500 meticaïs per ton for Type 1 and 7,200 meticaïs for Type 2, not including bags. Middleman prices to be paid by retailers and warehousemen will be set by an agreement between them. Price schedules have been set up to take transport costs into account.

In order to receive reimbursement for the transport cost, merchants must present to the plant or plant representative their registration card from the provincial directorate of domestic commerce. For their part, plants must keep a record of merchants.

Marketing of cashews from provinces in northern Save will be planned by the National Cashew Enterprise-Mozambique Cashew. No merchandise bought by the plants can be sold or surrendered by them without previous authorization from the company, after notification of the provincial governments.

In order that cashews might be delivered to the plants, the latter must take the necessary measures by setting up receiving stations working 24 hours around the clock. Plants must provide the necessary personnel to rapidly unload trucks in the order of their arrival. New or used bags furnished by middlemen will be given back to them or paid for at the new price minus 25 percent.

Seven ports are considered as shipping ports for this season: Mocimboa da Praia, Pemba, Quelimane, Pebane, Nacala, Angoche and Beira.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.

11,464
CSO: 4719/126

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

MAPUTO MILK CONSUMPTION--In order to meet the needs of the population, Maputo should have 44,000 liters of milk a day, but the local dairy does not have the capacity to meet such needs. It puts out only 30,000 liters a day. Furthermore, as a result of the lack of packing materials, the plant can furnish only 20,000 liters of stabilized milk that can be kept for long periods of time (in packages) and 2,000 liters of pasturized milk (in bottles), or half of the daily needs. Mozambique hopes to be able to make up its shortage by means of the delivery in October of 230 tons of milk from the UN World Food Program, after receiving 500 tons from Sweden in August. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1874, 9 Oct 81 p 2587] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

CSO: 4719/126

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

RND LEADER DISCUSSES PARTY'S OBJECTIVES, IDEOLOGY

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 250, 12-25 Oct 81 pp 25-27

[Article by Ginette Cot: "On the Side of the Opposition"]

[Text] Trying to grasp the personality of each of the opposition political parties that have just achieved legal status in Dakar is certainly not an easy task, especially since, if one wants to outline a presentation, one can only, for the time being, go by speeches, programs and declarations of intentions, awaiting a confrontation with the true circumstances in order to be able to judge the real practice, the importance and impact of each of the basic components of the new political scene. Furthermore, at first sight, the objectives and fundamental analyses seem to support one another. Consequently, the concern of those who ask "What good are so many parties?" is not totally without legitimacy.

The six organizations that have just been allowed to come out into the daylight are not completely -- far from it, especially in the case of their leaders -- unknowns in Dakar political circles. And yet, their semi-legal status did not permit them to reveal the extent of their real dimensions. It is obvious that their entry on the official scene has considerably modified the political structure previously in place and it is bound to have an effect on all participants in the process.

Furthermore, while it may well be a source of confusion, this broad range of parties (alongside the Socialist Party in power, there now exist nine opposition parties) nevertheless bears witness to a rich political tradition that has remained vital despite past vicissitudes.

The rivalry that this diversity implies and the confrontation of ideas, proposals and practices it presumes should lead to an overall, detailed, far-reaching and concrete search for suitable ways and means of bringing the country out of the profound crisis in which it has been plunged in the 20 years after nominal independence.

One can retort that this is not completely new. Most leftist organizations not recognized at that time -- with the exception of the RND [Democratic National Rally] -- had since 1978 been in a context of flexible concertation, called the Coordination of the United Senegalese Opposition (COSU) and built around a common program whose strategic task was to work for the victory of the democratic national people's revolution, a program that has inspired the proposals of certain new parties.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Bilateral concertations also took place between different organizations, when there was not joint work behind a precise task, as was the case between the old PAI-Senegal [African Independence Party] and the self-management socialists united behind Mamadou Dia, which since 1978 have published a sophisticated political monthly, ANDE SOPI.

And yet, as we know, the ostracism of the old government concerning the underground leftist organizations erected a kind of wall between the latter and the legal opposition parties. The new situation created by the establishment of the multi-party system can only lead, by lifting the obstacles, to an expansion of debate and concertation, its first visible consequence. At the same time, in the emulation necessarily created by the new dynamic, one can sooner or later expect a clarification. It is in fact in the confrontation with circumstances, the daily, overall struggles, that the real concerns, the sincerity and effectiveness of each, will appear.

Uncertainties and Instability

In this sense, it can be said that the hour of truth has come, not only for recently recognized parties, but for all the elements of the new political scene as well, elements that are now facing greater responsibilities. At the same time, one can also expect that sooner or later, perhaps more constructive and more representative reclassifications may come about. This hypothesis is all the more plausible because with the exception, naturally, of the Senegalese Republican Movement (MRS, conservative) set up by Boubacar Gueye and which appears to be a kind of accident of history, if not an ironic challenge put before the old system of imposed currents of thought, everyone in the opposition is on the left, a left that can be defined as ranging from the moderate left to the extreme left. Furthermore, while the controversy often remains lively between the different organizations in this sector and while the political debate is marked by a certain parochialism, the unity of the patriotic forces constitutes a concern that is unanimously shared or at least proclaimed by everyone.

However, it will still be necessary to define the lines of demarcation, the bases of a possible alliance, and to know the reason for such a union front. As one could see in the months preceding Senghor's departure, during which the unity of patriotic forces appeared to be an urgent task but when talks in that direction dragged on and on, unless there are stimulating events, it will not be an easy task.

The uncertainties and instability of the situation add to the complexity of things. Naturally, the change in persons at the head of state did not mean a radical change in regimes, far from it. Nevertheless, many things have begun to be altered and the innovations in style, action and government projects cannot fail to force the opposition to an approach and an adaptation consistent with them.

Now then, despite the ever greater difficulties in daily life confronting the majority of the population, difficulties that point to the possibility of an explosion of anger from the people, nothing indicates that the "state of grace" which the new government has heretofore enjoyed will disappear. Consequently, it is not surprising that perplexities are emerging and that speculation is rampant.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"Is the RND going to break up? Is the PDS slowing down? Is Mamadou Dia's People's Democratic Movement, only recently formed, going to disappear? Has what former President Senghor called the 'crypto-personal opposition,' referring to Cheikh Anta Diop and Mamadou Dia, moved over to make room for an Abdoulaye Wade-Abdou Diouf duel? Will the COSU collapse and ANDE-SOPI disappear? Will some be tempted by a dangerous surge forward and others by capitulation?" All of these rumors, which were circulating in Dakar in August, cannot simply be explained by the well-known fondness of the Senegalese for political games, any more than by deceptive measures, each aimed -- a phenomenon universally observed at all times and in all places -- at "pulling the covers over to one's side." But they definitely expose a certain malaise, if not a climate of confusion and embarrassed expectation in which everything seems possible.

Finally, as one may have felt at the time of the Gambian affair -- and of the suspicions and verbal attacks aimed at the opponents of military intervention in Banjul -- the democratic achievement made official in April, one which constitutes the first experiment of its type attempted on the continent, still appears to be very fragile. The annoying and troublesome adventure that has just happened in the PDS, several of whose members and leaders have been apprehended, an affair whose outcome must be known before the exact significance can be weighed, shows that anything can still happen.

On this shifting terrain, one can therefore try only to get a fix on a specific moment of the Dakar political situation. How do the recently recognized parties view the new situation? How are they original? What are their differences and objectives? How do they stand on the problem of unity? These are the questions that we shall try to answer.

Serene Style of RND

Formed in February 1976, the Democratic National Rally (RND), which was the object, during its fight for official recognition, of all kinds of trials and harassment, is without a doubt one of the movements that enjoy the broadest potential audience, not only because of the political honesty of its leaders, its worthy conduct, its serene style totally lacking in braggadocio and demagoguery, but also because of the realistic intelligence of its program, which is rooted in the socioeconomic reality of a country in which religious feelings play a predominant role and the phase of liberation and the rise of the nation is far from being over, a country which aims, relying on the organized and politicized population's own strength, at the establishment of "an independent, sovereign, democratic and popular state."

We also know that it was essentially in order to bar the way to the RND which, as its name suggests, intended to be the rallier of the country's patriotic forces, that the controlled multiparty system was imposed 5 years ago, which contributed more than a little to its prestige.

Following official recognition, the RND, through its secretary general, Prof Cheikh Anta Diop, defined the objectives of the policy he intended to follow during this phase in this way: "Consolidating the democratic opening so that it will become a continuing search; forging national unity above and beyond the divergencies of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ethnic groups, religious denominations and specific brotherhoods; creating the right political conditions that will enable the entire Senegalese nation to face the humiliating challenge of neocolonialism; and showing by deeds that the RND is concerned only with the task of building the nation."

It was undoubtedly these concerns, along with his acute awareness of the country's grave economic and social situation, that caused Prof Cheikh Anta Diop, at a press conference held by the RND in Dakar on 10 August -- the first public manifestation of the movement since its legalization -- to take up subjects rarely touched upon at political meetings of this type: energy problems (see L'ECONOMISTE DU TIERS MONDE, No 56, October 1981); the need for African nations to move toward a federal system of they want to emerge from their situation of underdevelopment and dependency on other countries; and finally, the promotion of national languages as an indispensable factor for a true democracy and the blossoming of the country's human potential.

"We could have held this conference in an abstract language," the secretary general of the RND explained. "We could have traced the history of our movement and recalled the fight it has waged. But everyone knows that. The important thing, in our opinion, was to propose concrete alternatives. We intend to emerge from the field of the traditional abstractions."

And yet, from there to thinking that the RND intended to duck the current questions was but a step that some took. However, the surprise does not stop there. Exposing the key to his approach, meaning that any opportunism, any complacency aimed at gaining facile popularity is obviously absent, the secretary general of the RND responded to a question and, at the same time he made the responsibility for the current crisis relative, he made a particularly calm evaluation of the action taken by the new Senegalese president: "I believe," he said, "that we must have the courage to say everything positive in the action of this government. It is repugnant to us to give the impression that we engage in opposition for opposition's sake. Parties can form openly, exit visas have been done away with, and I cannot say that everything is negative; that would not be reasonable. Furthermore, we must also consider the deep difficulties that are nearly out of the control of our small countries. The government compass is beginning to tremble precisely because of this impossible situation in which we find ourselves and also because of the political options chosen long ago. We will never be able to emerge from this situation until we agree to certain profound reforms. In the last eight months, things have happened that are apparently negative, but we must not forget that the fate reserved for all our isolated nations is chronic indebtedness, dependency on foreign financial backers."

Constructive Opposition?

Is it then a question, as some would think, of a blank check given to the new government? The rest of the speech belies such an interpretation: "If we do not change economic credos, Cheikh Anta Diop continued, "we shall get further and further off course. The IMF is often within our walls and assigns very astringent solutions to us that bother us. When the Senegalese Government is humiliated, I am also humiliated. I suffer morally, personally, from the humiliations we endure. Under such conditions, it is quite obvious that we shall find a solution only by changing

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

structures. What the government should perhaps have done was to draw up a balance sheet of our liabilities, say: 'Look at the abyss. That is our financial and economic situation. It is catastrophic and it demands a national effort. We are going to examine under what conditions the nation will agree to these efforts.' But if we try to steer the ship of state as well as we can while not breathing a word about all of this, that is when we shall engender difficulties like those we now face. Having said that much, there are things undeniably positive in the government's action and the opposition is the first to admit it, so that it will be clear that we are not practicing a policy of 'Get out of there so I can get in.' It is repugnant to us to be in the race for power for power's sake. The RND has already said it: It is interested only in the task of building the nation and will prove it by deeds. What concerns us, at a time when the countries on the continent are being destabilized, is to strengthen national cohesion. As for the government's action, we judge it with a freedom that proves that if tomorrow, the government acts in a harmful way, we shall say so. However, we must admit that the political future is necessarily uncertain, under the conditions in which we work, if they do not agree to the reforms that we recommend."

It is understandable that such lucid language, breaking with the style of the traditional pamphlets of any opposition party in general, may have irritated or intrigued some persons and that, once cut apart and with its nuances removed, it could give rise to interpretations and speculations that are hasty, to say the least. For example, the government press and the Socialist Party took advantage of the opportunity to hail in the RND, which not long ago was the object of violent attacks, the coming of an exemplary constructive opposition. Some commentators went even further, suggesting the possibility of the establishment of a government of national union between the PS and the RND. However, for the time being, nothing supports such a hypothesis. Moreover, as if a test question were being put to him: Was the RND willing to participate in the reforestation campaign decided upon by the government? Cheikh Anta Diop responded in the negative: "If there were any peril, we could rise up together. Today, on the spur of the moment, they cannot ask us to go plant trees. We must create the conditions that will enable the Senegalese nation to rise up as a single man."

The fact that this approach may have given rise to debate and questions within the RND itself is not surprising. The Democratic National Rally, as its secretary general recalls, is not in fact a monolithic party, but "a rallying of men and women from all political backgrounds who have come together to do what is essential, that is, bring about beneficial changes in the direction of the interests of the majority. It is at one and the same time our strength and our weakness."

Other specific traits of the Democratic National Rally deserve to be pointed out. The RND is not concerned with creating ties with other countries. "All the progressive parties in the world could, a priori, be our allies," Cheikh Anta Diop says, "but we believe that an extroverted attitude is not a good political education. We want to be free at all times. We shall concentrate on our country's conditions and we intend to derive all our strength from the Senegalese masses."

As for knowing what ideology the RND claims as its own, the secretary general states: "We apply the mass political line defined at our congresses. For six years, although they tried to impose one on us, we refused to stick a label on

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

our foreheads, out of dignity and in order to set an example, because it was not in keeping with the idea we had of political freedom, of the freedom of man and the deeper meaning of political action. Why should we now agree to accept a label?"

For Cheikh Anta Diop, in fact, given the current situation of the African countries, "the class struggle constitutes a phrase more than a real condition. That may be an aspiration," he believes, "but no political party can truly try to conduct its action based on the interests of a single class."

Its vocation as a rallier of patriotic forces, which the RND chose as soon as it was formed, and its rejection of any hasty action that might be short-lived undoubtedly explains its attitude to the problems of unity with other opposition forces, which criticize it for sometimes tending to "go its own way."

At the time of its founding, the RND proposed to other leftist groups -- all of which were then illegal -- to form the Democratic National Rally, while at the same time continuing to develop their own organizations with complete autonomy. "We imagined that solution because we knew that the political struggle waged together is sincere only if all are committed to the same extent," Cheikh Anta Diop says. "They replied with a refusal, but the RND is completely at ease in speaking of its relations with the other opposition groups. We remain constantly available to respond to any appeal, when it is a question of concerted action. Unity in order to promote greater political, economic and cultural independence will come about. All that we can get together, we shall. But unity will come about through vigorous action and not around a bargaining table. Nor does anything say that there can be no mergers. By dint of rubbing elbows, understanding one another and explaining our positions to one another, we shall perhaps finally pose the question of what does, in the final analysis, really separate us. The thick wall of prejudice could then begin to erode away until it finally collapses."

For the time being, and while awaiting a greater clarification of the situation, the RND goes about extending its base, which remains very uneven depending on the region, for different reasons, the least of which is not material difficulties.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.

11,464
CSO: 4719/124

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SEYCHELLES

RENE WANTS STRONGER TIES WITH FRANCE

PM091031 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIA in French 12-25 Oct 81 pp 9-12

[Part I of interview with Seychelles' President Albert Rene by Somon Malley:
"Seychelles Has Not Ceased to be Target of Imperialist Destabilization Attempts"--
date and place not given]

[Excerpts] When we turned to the subject of Franco-Seychelles relations [Albert Rene's] reaction was clear and categorical. How could this statesman, who was particularly close to the leftwing labor leaders in Britain when he was a young lawyer in London, fail to be happy to see "comrades in arms" in the Elysee, Matignon, the Quai d'Orsay and the National Assembly? He has many personal friends within the French left and makes no secret of his hope to meet with them soon:

"As soon as the results of the second round of the May French presidential election were announced I sent a congratulatory message to President Mitterrand from Tripoli, where I was making an official visit, and I informed him of the importance we attach to the development and intensification of fruitful cooperation between our two countries based on mutual respect.

"We always followed his stances on international policy issues closely when he was PS first secretary, especially those on cooperation between the industrialized and developing countries and toward those struggling for their independence, and his concern for peace and greater justice in the world.

"We were particularly moved by the content of his opening speech at the Paris conference on the least developed countries in which he hoped, like us, that in North-South relations 'the spirit of shared responsibility might replace distrust and indifference,' and that global negotiations might be started. 'Helping the Third World is helping yourself overcome the crisis'; President Mitterrand's apt expression strikes me as very true and is an excellent expression of that necessary shared responsibility."

But what hopes does the Seychelles have of the new cooperation and development policy announced by the Mauroy government and which Jean-Pierre Cot intends to implement?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"We hope it will strengthen and consolidate the cooperative relations between our two countries, based on mutual respect and reciprocal interest," President Albert Rene replied. "As far as principles are concerned, the approach taken by a new French cooperation policy, more especially in Africa, coincides with ours and opens up the prospect of a vast potential to be exploited. The initial contacts at ministerial level and especially the recent meeting between our foreign minister and [French External Relations Minister] Claude Cheysson open up prospects in which we place great hope for the mutual benefit of our two countries and our two peoples."

What about the Seychelles' security? The Seychelles regime, which is one of the favorite targets of American imperialism, which wants to make Diego Garcia a powerful base for aggression, is also facing all kinds of attempts at destabilization, sabotage, plots, mercenaries....

The Seychelles head of state has no illusions about the abandonment of these machinations against his regime owing to the very fact that it is progressive, anti-imperialist and that it defends socialist options: "The destabilization attempts," he stressed, "are not over. They are the sign that the revolutionary process is continuing in the Seychelles and that it is upsetting some people. The forms may change, become less brutal and more insidious, but the objective is the same: to stop the process of building a new society in the Seychelles or to divert it from its path. Moreover this impression as to the forms these attempts are taking must be altered in view of the apartheid regime's now direct intervention in the internal affairs of the countries in the region. The examples are increasingly numerous.

"In the division of roles among the imperialist powers it certainly seems that our region is being placed in its [the apartheid regime's] hands more than in the past in order to relieve the other powers. That is a real danger which we must watch carefully.

"But in face of the threats hanging over our country, its security depends primarily on its defense forces, which are, at the same time, working for its development. In addition to these forces there is the people's mobilization, especially through the people's militia. We are also developing cooperation with the progressive countries in the region and, on the military plane, our forces have, on several occasions, carried out joint maneuvers with the Tanzanian and Madagascan forces to test the level of coordination and their operational capability."

[Rene continues] "With regard to security in the Indian Ocean region, our position has always been clear. It must be ensured by the countries in the region, which do not threaten anybody's interests, or marine navigation or the oil supply routes. The real threat, on the other hand, hangs over our countries, our development efforts, and our peoples through this foreign military presence.

"Thus, in this specific sphere, the logic of our argument leads us to demand the withdrawal of all foreign military forces in the region, the dismantling of the military bases and an end to the facilities granted to them. Our demand applies to all foreign forces, irrespective of who they are and without any exception."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

And what does President Albert Rene think of the plan for a conference on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean? What progress has it made? How does he view the development of relations between the Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, reunion and the Comoro Islands?

The Seychelles head of state thinks that preparations for the Sri Lanka conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, scheduled for the end of the year or, at latest, early 1982 and which is to be held under UN auspices, are making no progress and that the blame for this rests with some great powers for whom peace and peoples' peace of mind are not subjects for discussion.

"We are continuing," he said, "our efforts and consultations to ensure that this desired peace is established and that the specter of intervention against the peoples is removed by demilitarization and the dismantling of the foreign bases in the region. As far as our region is concerned, we strongly advocate close regional cooperation among the Indian Ocean countries despite the different social and political systems which characterize their respective situations. That is our viewpoint on interstate relations, and we do not believe in interference in other states' internal affairs. Of course, in view of our progressive options, our interparty relations give priority to relations with the parties in the region which are struggling for progress, national and social emancipation, and the right of the peoples to self-determination--which, in our view, goes hand in hand with the as yet uncompleted decolonization process."

The more aggressive policy pursued by Washington since the Reagan administration took office is still one of President Albert Rene's main sources of concern. The adventurism, the race for the most destructive weapons and the cold war which the United States has launched herald a situation which is particularly explosive since the progressive Third World countries are one of the most immediate objectives of its aggressive policy, especially following its decision to train, arm and finance the Angolan, Mozambique, Khmer and Afghan counterrevolutionaries, among others, to increase its support for South Africa, to try to overthrow al-Qadhdhafi's regime by force and to regard all liberation movement fighters as "terrorists." Can President Albert Rene think of or suggest anything to counter this American offensive?

"We think," he replied without hesitation, "that we must present a united front through more regular consultations and discussions among progressive countries at a time when some administrations are basing their international relations policy on increasing aggressiveness. Any leaning toward national liberation, any struggle for justice and equality strikes them as suspect and to be condemned and prompts them to resort to provocation and direct intervention. In face of these dangers we must adopt a better coordinated strategy of struggle and show effective and constant solidarity among the advocates of progress and peace, the better to withstand this new offensive."

Our interview was not over. Other questions came to mind: Polisario, Namibia, South Africa, Israel and its aggressive policy against the Palestinians, Lebanese and Iraqis, the invasion of Angola, the future of southern Africa and also the evolution in the Seychelles' internal situation since the revolution of 5 June 1977....

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie

CSO: 4719/201

END

29

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY